have been:-i) To maintain price stability, subject to the monetary regime in current operation, for example the gold standard, a pegged exchange rate or an inflation target;
ii) To maintain financial stability, and to foster financial development more broadly;
iii) To support the State's financing needs at times of crisis, but in normal times to constrain misuse of the State's financial powers. In the past this meant preventing debasement and misuse of the inflation tax. Prospectively it may in future also involve preventing misuse of the bank tax.
Naturally the balance between these three objectives has shifted over time, with support for state financing becoming prominent during war-times. Indeed, several of the first Central Banks to be established, notably the Bank of England and the Banque de France, were founded to help provide war finance. But, absent wars, it is the shifting balance between the Central Bank's monetary policy (stable prices) and its may perhaps identify three main stable epochs from the past, with shortish periods of confusion and searching for a new regime/system in inter-regnums between them.
These three periods are (a) the Victorian era, say 1840s until 1914; (b) the decades of government control, 1930s until the end of the 1960s, and the triumph of the markets, 1980s until 2007. The period 1914-1931/33 was a confused inter-regnum including WWI, followed by a failed attempt to re-establish the Gold Standard (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 1992) . Similarly the 1970s was another confused inter-regnum between the subservience of monetary policies to government control, and the establishment of a free market system, with the Central Bank following a regime of inflation targetry.
Following the on-going financial crisis, Central Banks are now probably on the verge of a further, fourth, epoch, though the achievement of a new consensus on their appropriate behaviour and operations may well be as messy and confused, as in the two previous inter-regnums. But if we want to know where Central Banking may be heading, it is as well to have a good understanding of where we have been, since our historical record provides our only empirical evidence.
A. The Victorian Era: In Praise of the Real Bills Doctrine
The main concern of the great monetary writers of the Victorian age, notably Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot, was how to reconcile adherence to the Gold Standard with the maintenance of financial stability, especially at times of panic and stress.
[Though the Bank of England was also much concerned about the opposite problem of how to make Bank Rate effective in times of confidence and expansion.] The answers that came forth mostly took the form of certain rules of thumb, notably the Palmer rule for varying Bank rate (named after Governor Horsley Palmer of the Bank of England, which may, with the eye of faith, be seen as a kind of prototype Taylor reaction function), and the Bagehot rule for acting as Lender of Last Resort, which latter is all too often misinterpreted.
But the rule, or doctrine, that I want to focus on here is that concerning Real Bills. In this respect 'Real' does not mean 'adjusted for expected inflation' as now, but instead 'real' in the sense of being based on actual, 'real', output and/or trade. Whereas the correlate now of 'real' interest rates is 'nominal' interest rates, the correlate of 'real bills' in Victorian times was 'speculative' or 'finance bills'. Since 'real bills' were based on real output and trade, monetising them via Central Bank discounts could not create inflation, so the argument went, since output and money would rise hand in hand. Similarly since they were based on trade/output, they would become quasiautomatically self-financing when the good were eventually sold. In contrast, speculative, or finance bills, were drawn to support asset purchases, notably in stock markets, and hence generated unhealthy asset prices bubbles and busts with accompanying (temporary) inflation and deflation.
During the Victorian era, governments tended to run (small) surpluses during peacetime years. Deficits were generally a function of war. So, the standard assumption was that government paper, bills and bonds, was not related to underlying output/trade. So, under this doctrine, the purchase of government debt was just as reprehensible as open market operations in finance, or speculative, bills. While it may seem crazy now, one reason why the Fed was so reluctant to undertake expansionary open-market purchases of government debt in the depths of the Depression was that their model told them that this was quasi-automatically inflationary and wrong (see Meltzer, 2003) . One reason why it is worth remembering this episode now is that it puts in context the, historically mistaken, claims that have been made by some economists that Central Banks should only now carry out open market operations in government debt.
Another reason for recalling the 'real bills doctrine' was that it provided a unifying theoretical basis for both monetary policy (price stability) and financial stability. So long as discounts and lending were strongly directed to 'real bills' both price stability and financial stability would be jointly and simultaneously assured. Ever since this Victorian era we have lacked such a unifying theory. So now we wonder whether the single interest rate instrument can, or should, be made to bear double duty, to 'lean into the wind' of asset price and credit fluctuations as well as stabilising inflation, and its expectations; or whether a second set of macro-prudential regulatory instruments can be developed to maintain separate control of financial stability.
Of course, the 'real bills doctrine' was wrong. It was wrong for the same reason that the real business cycle model, that lies behind DSGE models, is wrong; it assumes implicitly that the private sector is inherently self-stabilising. So long as the government does not make everything worse by misguided intervention, the assumption was that output/trade would always return to equilibrium, so there would always be enough real bills to monetise to keep output at equilibrium and prices steady. When the Great Depression hit, this assumption collapsed. Deflation ensued. Certainly there was not much theory behind the government take-over of monetary policy; it was pragmatic. Initially with continuing depression and deflation governments pressed for low interest rates, once the Gold Standard had been abandoned, and with that for devaluation, at least against gold. Thereafter, with an excess demand for resources during WWII, the standard procedure was to control demand by direct rationing rather than by the price mechanism. By the time that rationing was ended, the selection of the official interest rate had become established in most countries as a governmental exercise, not only in war-time but at all times. This was, perhaps, least so in Germany (after WWII), Switzerland and the USA, where Central Bankers had, for a variety of reasons, some room for manoeuvre and ability to face down political pressures, but for most other countries the politicians, not the Central Banks, directed monetary policy. This is not to say that Central Banks in these more subservient countries had no influence on the conduct of monetary policies. They were treated by the relevant Minister(s) as expert advisors, alongside the civil servants in the Ministry of Finance (Treasury). But the Minister usually paid much more attention to the economists in his own Ministry; after all they had his ear. In contrast the Central Bank, certainly in the UK, emphasised their knowledge of market behaviour. These years, 1950s and 1960s, were a period when in the UK, and some other countries, the swollen war-time National Debt was only slowly being worked off, and the foreign exchange markets were often fragile during the Bretton Woods pegged-but-adjustable exchange rate regime. Under these conditions, should the Bank warn that "markets would not like" some proposed policy change, then Ministers would listen with attention. In the UK both Bank and Treasury fiercely guarded those areas where they dominated. The Treasury refused to allow the Bank to publish its own economic forecast, and sought to censor the economic commentary in the Bank's Quarterly Bulletin. In turn the Bank became exercised and hostile, should the Treasury attempt to second (junior) staff to City financial institutions in order to gain their own market expertise.
With interest rates being held generally low, to support investment and to lessen the cost of servicing the National Debt, there was a need for some additional policy to prevent undue credit expansion, which might threaten both the current account and also inflation. This was provided by direct quantitative controls, of one kind or another, over bank lending, reinforced by exchange controls over international capital movements and by controls over leasing terms, access to capital markets, etc., etc. In the UK there was an attempt to get away from direct controls over bank lending in 1971 with the adoption of the policy of 'Competition and Credit Control'. But the Heath government were not willing to allow interest rates to rise sufficiently high; the policy failed; and a final version of direct lending controls, known as 'the Corset', was reintroduced in 1974, and lasted until 1981.
One of the lessons that had been learnt, rightly or wrongly, from the financial collapse in 1929-33 was that competition within the financial system was dangerous to the maintenance of stability. Such competition pared profit margins and hence the buildup of capital buffers. It encouraged banks to take on more risk in pursuit of higher profits. The more oligopolistic banking systems, for example in Canada and the UK, had fared better than the more competitive and less diversified system in the USA.
Consequently many of the 'reforms' enacted in the 1930s were intentionally anticompetitive, limiting the interest rates that could be paid on deposits and limiting the scope of business that various groups of intermediaries could undertake. Thus housing mortgages would only be provided by some specified group of mortgage, housing finance, intermediaries; credit provision or personal sector purchases of consumer durables by another financial group, and so on.
In many countries during this era not only was the amount of private sector credit expansion constrained, but so also were the rates at which they could do such business. Given these constraints, financial intermediaries naturally satisfied the demands of their biggest and safest customers first. There was no call for financial innovation; bank managers were trained to say 'no', rather than 'yes'; and they, and their counterparts in mortgage banking, followed the 3:6:3 rule, i.e. borrow at 3%, lend at 6% and on the golf course at 3 p.m. Lunches were long and liquid. The current nostalgia for the controlled conditions of the post-war period is misplaced.
But such a controlled system is, by and large, a safe system. Between the Great Depression and the 1970s there was a comparative dearth of bank failures. The story of the search, thereafter, for some other anchor for policy, and its (chance) discovery in 1988 in New Zealand in the guise of an inflation target is well-known.
What is, perhaps, less often realised is that the setting of the official interest rate, in order to hit the inflation target, does not need to be done by an (independent) Central Bank. It can just as easily (in an operational sense) be carried out by the Ministry of Finance. Indeed in the UK Chancellors of the Exchequer had the final say on the choice of interest rate, from 1992/93 when, after ejection from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the UK adopted an inflation target, until 1997 when
Gordon Brown gave the Bank of England operational independence.
What such operational independence for the Central Bank provides is credibility for the policy of inflation targetry. In contrast, a Minister of Finance has conflicts of interest. The best known such conflict is with the desire for a more expansionary policy (especially before an oncoming election). But almost as pressing, when the National Debt is high relative to taxable capacity, is the Minister's desire to keep the interest burden low. Central Bank operations in public sector debt and in rate setting have an immediate and direct fiscal impact. As the burden of National Debt will now rise once more, questions of coordination between fiscal policy, debt management and interest rate setting, which have been largely in abeyance in the last couple of decades, will come to the fore again.
Meanwhile, the development of the euro-dollar market in particular, and of the global financial system in general, was changing the nature and structure of banking, and with it of the regulatory approach to the industry. Previously banks had felt constrained by the available stock of (essentially retail) deposits held with them, whose total was largely outside a banker's control. Their margin of freedom to expand (or reduce) loans to the private sector, given the quantum of such deposits, lay in their ability to offload (or buy) marketable public sector securities (liquid assets).
Fortunately for the banks they had been stuffed full of government debt during WWII, and so entered the post-war period in a highly liquid form. So, their ability to expand loans, when direct controls were not biting, seemed to lie in their holdings of such liquid assets. In response, theories about the money supply (Sayers, Modern Banking, umpteen editions) and regulation then (1950s and 1960s) focussed much more on liquidity, and a variety of required liquidity ratios.
All that got blown away by the development of the euro-dollar and other wholesale markets. Now a banker was no longer constrained by a combination of exogenous retail deposits and available liquid assets. If the banker wanted more funding, he could just borrow it in wholesale markets. Funding liquidity had replaced asset liquidity.
What then determined the size of banks' books? Not cash, since the Central Bank had to provide enough cash to keep market rates in line with the official rate; not liquid assets for the above reason. The answer, of course, was capital. But here there was a problem for the regulators. First, while more capital would make a bank safer, it would, given the unpriced insurance given to bank depositors/bond holders and the tax wedge, lower the return on equity (ROE). In banking, the Modigliani/Miller theorem did not hold. So limited liability equity holders would encourage bankers into adopting riskier strategies (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010) , an encouragement that bankers hardly needed, to don their vestments as 'Lords of the Universe'.
The second concern was that the collapse of a bank, because of a combination of size and interconnectedness, would cause contagious externalities. The financial system was subject to various self-amplifying mechanisms in both the upwards, bubble, and the downwards, bust, phases of the credit cycle.
For both these reasons, banks could not be expected, of their own independent volition, to hold sufficient capital, in order to obtain the best social trade-off between risk and return. Indeed by the mid 1980s capital ratios amongst banks had been declining quite steadily and sharply for some long time.
Chart 1 Capital ratios for UK and US banks The catalyst to enforce regulatory change was the Mexican/Argentinean/Brazilian (MAB) crisis of 1982. During the 1970s Western, mostly US, commercial banks had intermediated successfully between oil exporting emerging economies, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and oil importing emerging economies, such as Argentina and Brazil. With other commodity prices quite high and real interest rates low, often negative, the borrowers had no problems in servicing their debts. Paul Volcker's regime switch utterly altered the context. Real interest rates rose steeply and commodity prices tumbled. Neither the borrowers nor the bankers saw the danger quickly enough, lulled by Citibank's CEO who erroneously believed that 'Sovereign countries do not default'. In 1982 MAB threatened to do just that. Even without default the secondary market valuation of such loans fell so far that, on a mark-tomarket basis, most US city-centre banks were insolvent.
Congress was outraged (every financial collapse, 1907, 1929, 1982, 2007/8, provokes Congressional rage; Wall St is not beloved on Capitol Hill) that the banks had put the financial system in such a fragile state, and wanted to insist that all the US banks establish a stronger capital base. But the US banks complained that they would then lose business to foreign banks, especially to Japanese banks, not subject to such The initial risk 'buckets' in Basel I were crudely defined, which gave an incentive to banks to securitise those loans/assets whose regulatory requirement was excessive, and to hold those assets where the regulatory requirement was comparatively too soft.
It was this latter failing that brought about the further negotiations leading up to Basel II, whereby the risk weightings were to be based on (the banks' own) risk assessments (the Internal Risk Based, IRB, approaches). While altering the risk weightings, Basel II, made no significant changes to the definition, or required quantum, of capital.
The implicit belief was that this, arbitrarily chosen, level of capital would suffice to act as a guarantor of continued bank solvency. With bank solvency thereby assured, banks should face no difficulty in meeting any (temporary) liquidity requirements by borrowing in efficient, broad wholesale markets. These comfortable assumptions fell apart in August 2007.
Meanwhile the trend in credit expansion to the private sector had for several decades comfortably outstripped the trend growth in bank deposits, (Schularick and Taylor, 2009 ), though quite why this was so remains unclear. Commercial banks had responded by:
i. Selling off their liquid public sector debt;
ii. Borrowing more and more, often on a short-dated basis, from wholesale markets; and iii. Securitising their loan books, (originate to distribute).
All this reinforced their exposure to, and fragility in the face of a malfunction in such wholesale markets.
Moreover, during the years of confidence and asset price boom, banks were taking on additional leverage, in each case subject to their own particular set of regulatory requirements. Both US investment houses (broker/dealers) and European banks were subject to Basel II, but not to a simple leverage ratio. So they increased leverage sharply by filling their portfolios with highly rated (AAA) mortgage backed securities (MBS), which carried a minuscule risk-weighting. In contrast the US commercial banks were subject to a simple leverage ratio, but not at that time to Basel II. So they exploited their position by taking on the riskier tranches of MBS.
But few, whether bankers, regulators or economists, perceived this overall fragility, though many realised that risk was being under-priced. A reason for this blindness was the procyclicality of Basel II, (since risk seemed low, risk-weighted capital appeared to rise!), and of mark-to-market accounting, (when asset prices rise, the resulting capital gains in trading books go straight into profits and enhanced capital).
Never had the profitability and capital strength (over the last couple of decades) of the banking sector seemed higher, never had market appreciation of bank risk, as measured by banks' CDS market prices, seemed more sanguine than in the early summer 2007. With the benefit of hindsight, a populist frenzy now blames the excesses of bankers for putting the system at risk, and the weakness (light-touch) of regulators/supervisors for allowing this to happen. But at the time neither bankers, nor regulators, nor virtually all commentators had any appreciation of the (systemic) risks that were being run.
Whether, or not, the inevitable 'blame game' is worthwhile, or justified, the experience of financial crisis, panic in September 2008 to March 2009, and nearly widespread financial collapse, has been so unnerving and shaking that there is likely to be far-reaching changes to the operation and regulation/supervision of the financial system in general, and to the role and functions of the Central Bank in particular. It is to this latter subject that we now turn in the second Section.
The Future Role of the Central Bank?
In the years prior to August 2007, Central Banks had appeared to have almost perfected the conduct of monetary policy. The standard regime was one in which the Central Bank was delegated operational independence to vary the official short term interest rate in order to achieve an inflation target, which target in turn was mandated either in general terms or in specific numerical terms by the democratically elected government. What we now recognize is that the achievement of price stability by this procedure does not guarantee financial stability. That raises first the question whether this standard procedure whereby the Central Bank should dedicate setting the official interest rate to the achievement of its inflation target should be radically altered? My answer to that, which I have developed in other papers -and will not be rehearsed again here -is NO.
The implication of this answer is that a separate additional set of (macro-prudential, regulatory) instruments will need to be developed for the specific purpose of maintaining financial stability. infer from that that the financial stability authority has to be given command over liquidity management; but that also implies that the financial stability authority would have command over the Central Bank balance sheet. Indeed the financial stability authority would then, de facto, become the true Central Bank.
Lord Cobbold, former Governor of the Bank of England, is reputed once to have said "A Central Bank is a bank, not a study group". What I take this to mean is that the essence of Central Banking lies in its power to create liquidity, by manipulating its own balance sheet. The question is often asked whether a Central Bank that sets interest rates should also manage financial stability. This question is put the wrong way around. The question should be whether a Central Bank that manages both liquidity and financial stability should also be given the task of setting interest rates.
Unlike the essential role of liquidity management, setting official interest rates is not essential for a Central Bank. As we already saw in the opening historical Section, in many countries and for many decades, it was done by a politician, not the Central Bank. It could easily be done by a 'study group', as many Monetary Policy Committees really are, and they could be formally separated from the Central Bank without much loss. Or indeed interest rate setting could be done by a coven of Druids casting runes over the entrails of a chicken. What is important is not so much who does it, as how it is done; the need is for a reaction function that restores equilibrium smoothly and surely after some adverse demand or supply shock. We shall, however, leave our initial question, whether the liquidity managing Central Bank, charged with financial stability oversight, should also set the official interest rate until later.
One of the main concerns of the Bank of England in the 19
th century was how to make its Bank Rate effective in the market. Under normal circumstances the main task of the monetary management desk in Central Banks is to undertake OMO, so as to drive market rates into line with the separately set official rate. At such ordinary times, this is a somewhat hum-drum exercise, hardly noticed by most people, but of considerable technical interest to the cognoscenti. But, under conditions of financial disturbance and crisis, liquidity management takes on a life of its own, potentially independent of official interest rates. This is patently obvious once nominal interest rates hit the zero lower bound, so that subsequent unconventional measures, whether quantitative easing, credit easing or the ECB's suite of market measures, all involve OMO and manipulation of the Central Bank's balance sheet.
But even when interest rates are above the zero bound, there is a range of freedom to operate liquidity management independently. This margin of freedom may now, perhaps, be greatly augmented by the generalised adoption of the 'corridor' system for managing short-term interest rates. In principle at least, the corridor system could be so managed that liquidity policy and interest rate policy could be varied in a largely independent fashion. Thus, for example, official interest rates could be raised to counter speculative attacks on the exchange rate, while at the same time the liquidity of the domestic financial system could be maintained, or even enhanced, leaving market rates at the lower edge of the corridor. For the time being Central
Banks are still experimenting with the extra degree of freedom that the corridor system has given them. During the financial crisis many of the innovations in liquidity management were a somewhat ad hoc response to each new twist of the crisis. Looking forward, there is still much to learn and to discover in this field.
One of the more contentious topics in liquidity management is what should be the set of assets in which the Central Bank should operate and hold on its balance sheet.
Again, as we noted in the historical Section, fashions change. Under the 'real bills doctrine', the commercial paper of the private sector was the preferred asset for OMO. Since WWII, the preferred asset has, in most countries, become government short-term paper, bills or short-dated bonds. But some more fortunate countries have not had to develop a broad market in their own government paper, and they carry out liquidity management through other assets, in some cases foreign exchange, as in Switzerland or Hong Kong.
Whatever asset is used for OMO, it is likely to have fiscal consequences. For example, the UK's quantitative easing has had massive fiscal consequences. Indeed, it is precisely because the fiscal consequences of setting interest rates and undertaking OMO in public sector debt are so great, that their exercise has been delegated to the Central Bank, to avoid the politicians being subject to massive conflicts of interest.
The concern about the choice of market for Central Bank operation should not be so much on its fiscal implications, but rather on the extent to which such intervention might distort relative prices and have a distributional effect, benefiting one set of borrowers rather than another. But this raises a question and a problem. When some financial markets malfunction, so borrowers in that market suffer relative to the rest of the economy, would Central Bank intervention directly in that market just restore the status quo ante, and thereby stabilise an adverse distribution; or is that intervention having a distributional effect which Central Banks ought to eschew? For fervent adherents in the efficient markets theory, there is no contest. For everyone else, the issue is much more nuanced. Fed credit easing, for example in the commercial paper and MBS markets, is a case in point. In practice such questions will probably usually be answered pragmatically, 'needs must'; and such a pragmatic response is, to my mind, preferable to one based on theoretical ideology.
B. Interactions with Government
One of the attractions, to many economists and others, of the standard inflation targeting regime was that the choice of interest rates could be made independent of government, but to achieve an objective democratically mandated. That same separation and independence is not really feasible in the pursuit, by the Central Bank, of its financial stability objective. We have already discussed how a Central Bank's liquidity management, and especially its unconventional measures, will have both fiscal and distributional consequences. Here we shall consider some four or five further ways in which the Central Bank and the government may need to interact.
(i) The Bank Tax   1 The imposition of a tax on banks is an idea whose time has come, especially now that President Obama called for such a tax in January 2010. Governments' fiscal positions are so stretched; banks and bankers are so unpopular; the tax can be justified as a quid pro quo for potential future, or for past, taxpayer support of the banking/financial system. Although the parameters, the tax base, and most other details have yet to be determined, a bank tax is likely to be adopted, either unilaterally in many countries or internationally.
The analogy, which Perotti (2010) makes, is with the inflation tax and seignorage.
There is a temptation for politicians to make excessive use (from an overall social welfare standpoint) of the inflation tax. So a solution is to mandate the Central Bank to hold inflation at a desired, low and stable, level, but to pass the proceeds of seignorage to the government.
By the same token there could be a temptation for governments to impose a tax on the banking system that would not optimise social welfare, either by failing to operate in an ex ante preventive fashion, or by being so draconian as to impede the essential intermediation and allocative functions of that system. Perotti's idea is to combine a low basic tax rate with prudential, time-varying surcharges. "Variable surcharges should be chosen by a macro prudential council where central banks play a significant role." The revenue from both the basic rate and the surcharges would flow to the government.
Whatever may be thought of this particular idea, a bank tax will have financial stability implications. It would surely be wrong to introduce such a tax without a full exploration of the relationship between the tax and the financial stability objective.
(ii) Sanctions
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has no formal legal status, being only an advisory Standing Committee to the G-10 Central Bank Governor meeting at the BIS in Basel. It could only put recommendations, and suggestions, to the Governors.
Understandably, but regrettably, they interpreted this as meaning that it was for each nation State, not for the BCBS, to decide how their proposed standards, especially the capital ratios, should be enforced. So the BCBS never discussed how sanctions might be imposed for short-falls below the proposed ratio(s).
In effect, with no discussion of a ladder of increasingly tough sanctions, the Basel requirements became treated by everyone as minima, to be observed at all times. But, as already noted, such requirements were intentionally designed to raise capital levels above those that banks would want to keep of their own accord. So the available margin of safety, the buffer of excess capital beyond that required, was generally kept quite low by the banks. This led to a poor outcome, in that the banks held a stock of required capital that could not be trenched upon without signalling a crisis occasion, ii) The accumulation of a, bank-financed, 'orderly liquidation fund'; and
iii) The imposition of hair-cuts on unsecured and secured creditors in order of seniority
While there are good arguments in favour of such proposals, I doubt whether such an 'orderly liquidation process' will suffice to end TBTF. The losses that may need to be absorbed, partly as a result of fire sales into unwilling markets, are likely to deter investors from putting additional capital into other banks. So the dynamic market process, as began to emerge after the Lehman bankruptcy (and before the capital injections by governments), could bring a large proportion of the financial system towards default simultaneously. Could any government seriously envisage liquidating half (or more) of its banking system simultaneously? And if they did press on with such massive liquidation, would they be sensible to do so?
Even in the case of one large bank, and even assuming that depositors could be provided quickly with transactions balances elsewhere, the withdrawal of access to funds by borrowers with unused credit facilities could have a devastating effect on them, especially if the liquidator sought early repayment of outstanding loans. This is not the place to go into more radical ideas, such as Larry Kotlikoff's mutual banking, (similar to Islamic banking with similar drawbacks), or making all banks 'narrow' or tiny, or both. They will not happen, and for good reason.
So, the upshot is that government insurance of the systemically important parts of our financial systems will remain in place for the foreseeable future. As the ultimate provider of such insurance, governments will want, and need, to maintain a close involvement with the conduct of systemic stability. Thus the institution running systemic stability will be, in practice, the Central Bank.
But this institution does not necessarily also need to set the official interest rate.
Should that be hived off to a separate body?
Throughout this Sub-Section, I have emphasized that, willy-nilly, the Central Bank in its systemic stabilisation role will have to work closely with Government. Indeed, despite the patent, but in the end hopeless, desire to get away from TBTF, I see the linkages between Central Bank and government becoming stronger, as the bank tax, the need for a ladder of sanctions, the much enhanced role of debt management all conspire to drive government and Central Bank back into each other's arms.
One of the arguments for separating interest rate setting from Central Banking (and systemic stability) is that the former depends for its credibility on independence, whereas the latter is conjoint with government. I have never been much swayed by
this. An institution can wear two hats simultaneously. A similar argument is that the combination of responsibilities would lead to conflicts of interest. Again I would tend to argue that the main failures of Central Banks, as interest rate setters, have lain in taking too little account of financial conditions and monetary developments, not too much.
Possibly a more persuasive argument is that the combination of operational independence to set interest rates and liquidity management together with prospective macro-prudential regulation just vests too much power in a non-elected body. There is some force in this. When we turn to the international, (including here the Euro-zone), context the problem of coordination becomes much more difficult. The basic problem is that the financial system is cross-border, if not global, whereas both the legal structure and fiscal competences remain national. There are two logical possibilities. The first is to make the financial system conform to national boundaries, but this would be anathema both to most of the cross-border financial intermediaries and, more important, to all those upholding the single European market. The second is to harmonise a limited, but appropriate, set of laws relating to the resolution of cross-border intermediate (Avgouleas, Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2010) and to provide some form of agreement over fiscal burden sharing. What needs to be done to achieve this latter is now reasonably well discerned (W. Fonteyne, et al., 'Crisis Management and Resolution for a European Banking System', IMF, 2010). The problem remains to get political agreement to take this program forward. Absent such agreement, the treatment of cross-border financial crises will remain a dangerous dark hole.
D. Structural Development in the Financial Sector
Direct government intervention in the financial sector in our second epoch, 1930s to 1960s, was consciously so far-reaching that, to some large extent, the structure of intermediation was largely determined by regulation and controls. Then in our third epoch, 1979 to 2007, the ethos changed. The government should set the overall framework, especially the rule of law and the monetary regime, but beyond that structural changes were to be determined by private sector market processes and innovations. Whatever met the test of the market was, prima facie at least, considered to be good. Now we are moving back, perhaps somewhat unconsciously in reaction to the crisis, towards the second more interventionist mode. Perhaps in this coming epoch, intervention will be less draconian, less based on direct quantitative control, and more on the pricing mechanism, perhaps via bank taxes and graduated macro-prudential regulation. But such intervention will still shape the future structural development of the financial system. Central Banks used to be concerned with such structural issues. They saw themselves as having a deliberate role to play in shaping the developing structure of the financial system. More recently, they have eschewed such a role. As we return to an epoch of greater government (and Central Bank) intervention in markets, Central Banks had better brush up their understanding of, and participation in, such structural issues.
Conclusions
The first (Victorian) and third Bank as an independent institution will be put aside.
I do not myself see that this greater extent of interaction between Central Bank and government on those other fronts need prevent the continuation of the present desirable procedure whereby the Central Bank also has operational independence to set the official short-term rate. But some will see an inconsistency. If so, their answer should be to hive off the interest-rate setting function to a separate (study) group (of economists?). But do not confuse the study group with the Central Bank.
Cobbold's dictum was valid.
